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Book Review

R. Blake Brown, A Trying Question: The Jury in Nineteenth-Century.
Canada.Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode Society
for Canadian Legal History, 2009. x, 335 pp.

In a 1984 review essay on the inter-relationship(s) of law and society in
English criminal law historiography, Doug Hay observed that "in history,
there is no 'background,"" His point was that there are an infinite number
of backgrounds, all of which are moving and changing, often in non-linear
fashion, at different paces, either in counter-point or direct dialogue with the
foreground which is the immediate subject of exposition. Legal historians
who put their topics "in context" by treating the background as static are
now fortunately few, at least when this background is conceived of as
social or economic. But as Hay observed, the most immediately significant
context for any area of legal history is often itself legal, and it is this legal
context-the institutions, the rules of procedure and evidence--of which
legal historians need to be the most aware, but often take for granted. Not
that this is entirely our fault: while we have ample secondary sources on
many non-law aspects of nineteenth century Canadian society, the nittygritty of the system has not attracted the same interest. While there are
compelling stories about eccentric judges, or the consequential narratives
these individuals produced, to be celebrated, excoriated or otherwise
deconstructed, it is a brave researcher who chooses to devote him or
herself to the dry bones of statutory changes to faceless structures such
as the jury. Popular culture may imbue juries with drama galore, but this
is necessarily fictional, since where reasoning and communication are the
duty of (modem era) high court judges, that of jurors has been discretion
and opacity.
Canadian legal historians therefore have good reason to be grateful to
R. Blake Brown, a legally trained historian currently assistant professor in
the history department at St. Mary's University in Halifax, for choosing
this subject for his doctoral dissertation (The jury,politics, andthe state in
British North America: Reforms tojury systems in Nova Scotia and Upper
Canada, i825-1867, Dalhousie University, 2005, under the supervision
of the editor of this journal) and to the Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History and University of Toronto Press for publishing his revised
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and expanded version as a monograph. The caveat here is that some will
be disappointed if they take the book title at face value. The subtitle of
A .Trying Question: The Jury in Nineteenth Century Canada is somewhat
misleading. If "Canada" taken as all of what is now Canada, or even
what was then Canada, then restricting the discussion to Nova Scotia and
Ontario as he does is problematic. In addition, the "nineteenth century"
identified as particularly relevant to jury reform, the 1820s to 1880s, is a
short one indeed. Nevertheless, it is a safe prediction that A Trying Question
will soon be one of the most cited works of legal history in this country,
and for good reason. Brown has done an exemplary job of detailing the
changes in jury structure in the two jurisdictions he examines during this
time period.
Of course, the book functions as far more than an expanded
encyclopaedia entry. Brown's primary purpose is to examine the political
reasons behind the changes to the jury in both its forms, the trial or
petit (petty) jury, the fact-finding body which is still with us, albeit in
comparatively restricted ambits, and the grand jury, which is no more in
Canada (although it maintains a significant presence south of the border)
and which was once a mainstay of both the prosecution process and local
governance. American and British historians have attributed this "decline"
in the prominence of the jury, experienced in all common law jurisdictions
to various degrees, to several factors, including increased technical
complexity and professionalization of the prosecution process, the
influence of legal formalist thought which prioritized reason over intuition,
rules over facts, and education over local knowledge, and economic
instrumentalism by state and judiciaries whereby private corporate interests
were protected from short-sighted, bleeding-heart juror sympathy. Brown
does not take issue with these explanations, but insists that place-specific
factors also played their part. Using a comparative model, he argues that
"understanding the causes of legal change requires an analysis of the effect
of local change on inherited legal culture." (11) In effect, the why of such
an important transformation cannot be understood apart from the how.
Tracing the trajectories of a set of political issues involving the jury in these
two similar but far from identical jurisdictions, he comes to the conclusion
that a number of locally determined, inter-related factors were also keythe rise of responsible government (provincially and municipally), party
and the press; the influence of liberal thought and discourse; the process
of state formation; and above all, the agitation and agency of what might
be called the juror community, those people who were inconvenienced by
jury duty, both personally and financially.
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Whereas. Brown's dissertation was organized geographically,
chronologically, and thematically, here he has attempted to create larger
categories of synthesis. Thus, Part One is "Juror Apathy and Allegations
of Jury Packing, 1820s- 1848," Part Two covers "Responsible Government
and the Jury, 1848-1867," and Part Three "The Decline of the Jury in PostConfederation Canada, 1867-1880s." Within each part are alternating
chapters on Ontario and Nova Scotia, two for each jurisdiction in the first
section, which occupies about a half of the book, and one each in each
of the two subsequent sections. Each part also includes an introduction
and conclusion, and each chapter 'a concluding recapitulation. These
repetitions and summaries may strike some as redundant, but readers who
are interested in an overview or in locating a specific jurisdiction, period
or change rather than following the entire minutiae of bills, acts and causes
cMlbbres will no doubt welcome the opportunities for skimming or more
targeted reading.
In Part One, Brown addresses the question of how the ostensibly
sacred aura of the English jury system was eroded from the start by the
realities of transplantation into a different and challenging environment.
In England, jury duty denoted power and status, but in Nova Scotia those
called to jury duty saw only travel in poor weather on poorer roads, time
away from farm or fishing, and the annoyance that one might not even be
called on to deliberate. English sheriffs often selected those who lived
near the court house, but in 1777 Nova Scotia instituted a form of balloting
to ensure geographic representativeness, and jurors often had to travel
long distances. Absenteeism was a chronic problem, and complaints were
vocal and constant. Even those who did not have to travel had cause for
complaint: due to the small population, a single grand jury in Halifax was
selected to serve in sessions throughout an entire year. However, service
on grand juries was slightly less irksome, presumably due to the role this
institution played in local governance, providing the opportunity for grand
jurors to exercise patronage in the appointment of local officials such as
overseers of the poor and highway surveyors. The grand jury in both
jurisdictions also had a powerful and meaningful criminal law function in
determining the sufficiency of indictments which were presented to them
by a clerk, the finding of "a true bill," on which a trial with a smaller,
"petit" jury could proceed.
Although they experienced similarproblems in adapting thejury system
to colonial reality, Brown finds that "[p]rior to 1850, ... Upper Canadians

did not express their distaste for jury service with the same intensity or
frequency,"(43) due to differences in jury selection procedures-sheriffs
could prefer the closer candidates-and the (relative) superiority of their
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transportation system. Implied is a more robust tax base in rural Upper
Canada: not only did this result in better roads, but also a propensity to
look to financial compensation to ease the costs of time and travel instead
of advocacy to reduce requirements for jury service as in Nova Scotia.
Whether due to the less bothersome nature of jury service, the relatively
minimal role of grand juries in local governance (officials were elected at
township meetings), Simcoe's efforts at anglicization, or simply a more
homogeneous population, "English jury ideology held a tighter grasp on
the minds of many Upper Canadians." (47)
One problem that bedevilled both colonies was the perception that
sheriffs exercised inappropriate power in the jury selection process,
thereby indirectly affecting the outcomes of criminal trials and civil suits.
In England sheriffs were appointed on a yearly basis: in Upper Canada
and Nova Scotia sheriffs served at the pleasure of the governor, giving
rise to suspicions concerning their neutrality, especially in politically
sensitive state prosecutions and libel cases. In Nova Scotia, various
attempts were made to mitigate this perception. In 1838, the legislature
turned to a committee system, whereby each county was to select three
magistrates each representing a different area, to prepare lists of eligible
grand jurors along with the sheriff. This system floundered quickly when
the magistrates, who were not remunerated for their efforts, did not
cooperate, resulting in verdicts which were vulnerable to challenge. The
legislature was embarrassed into passing retroactive curative legislation,
but did not retreat from their course, as they extended the committee
process to trial juries.
Renewed criticisms arose in Nova Scotia in the 1840s, with the advent
of party politics and a partisan press, which when combined with ethnic
tensions between Irish Catholics and English Protestants placed a number
of juries in an unflattering public spotlight. Although Joseph Howe's
victory augmented the reputation ofjuries, subsequent libel trials with less
happy outcomes for critics of the establishment did not. The legislature
responded with further amendments to the committee system, but the
half-hearted participation by inadequately paid magistrates continued. In
Upper Canada, claims of jury packing also had a long and noisy history,
accompanied by years of efforts by the reform movement to de-politicize
the system. From the Tory point of view, this alleged de-politicization
was disingenuous at best and dangerous at worst, and Family Compacters
like John Beverley Robinson drew on the language of British tradition to
argue that the reformers were the ones doing the politicizing.
Once the Upper Canadian reformers achieved their primary goal of
responsible government, jury reform was high on the agenda, in ways
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both indirect and direct. The Municipal Act of 1849 transferred most of
the extant local government functions of grand juries to elected municipal
corporations. Once the Crown Attorneys Act of 1856 professionalized the
indictment process, the grand jury began to seem moot in its prosecutorial
function as well. In 1850 an innovative JuryAct created a complex system
of balloting and recording designed to remove discretion from the system,
but which carried a heavy cost, downloaded to the new municipalities. This
included fees for selectors, for clerks who were responsible for endless
copying and reporting, and eventually for jurors as well. These incentives
were accompanied by significant penalties: non-compliance with statutory
directions was to be punished with fines and imprisonment. Interestingly,
in contrast to the trend to democratization in the political sphere, the
property threshold for jury service was raised twice. If the rationale for
this was to improve the jury's stature, it was a successful but ultimately
wasted effort, as criticism began to centre on a cost/benefit analysis which
drew on the new discourses of liberals to condemn juries as un-educated,
un-predictable and downright un-necessary.
In Nova Scotia, attempts to secure democratic muiicipal reform
were less successful. Halifax was incorporated in 1841, but rural grand
juries continued to perform local government functions until county
incorporation was mandated in the 1870s. The infamous "magistrates'
affair" of 1848 began a trend of partisan replacements in the magistracy
following changes in government which further corroded the reputation of
juries as disinterested arbiters. Reforms designed to increase the inclusivity
of juries to embrace Irish Catholics and Nova Scotians of colour merely
underscored the deep political nature of the role. Deficiencies in jury
selection propriety attracted the condemnation ofjudges and lawyers, who
also began to use language of liberalism to express their lack of faith in
the institution.
Brown notes that the Nova Scotia government was less "muscular" in
asserting the power of the state in this situation, neglecting to use either
the carrots of significant remuneration or the sticks of heavy fines and
threats of imprisonment employed by Upper Canada to make its agents
behave. Both jurisdictions began gradually to diminish the requirements
for juries in civil, and then in criminal cases. Responsibility for criminal
law passed to the new Dominion government in 1867, and Brown remarks
on the irony that John A. Macdonald, who had been staunch in appealing
to traditional jury ideology in previous debates, promoted the extension of
summary justice with the Speedy Trials Act of 1869..
Somewhat confusingly, Brown contends that because many of
the advocates for the elimination or diminution of the jury were equity
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lawyers and judges, the contemporaneous movement for the fusion of
law and equity may have played a part in the debate over the jury. No
doubt those comfortable in arguing and dispensing equity law might have
felt uncomfortable with an ideology that portrayed the jury as the sine
qua non of British justice and liberty. However, if he means to suggest
that the fusion movement itself helped to legitimate the juryless justice
imparted by the courts of chancery in the minds of the denizens of the
dominant common law culture, this is an interesting speculation, and one
which merits more than the casual mention Brown affords it. A similarly
fascinating but fleeting observation is that juries have come to have less
appeal in an era which chooses to place its trust in rights documents.
Perhaps the hegemonic liberalism which Brown sees as antithetical to
the jury system is predisposed to prefer language-based correctives to
institutional checks and balances.
A history focussed on the mid-nineteenth century, and a groundbreaking
one at that, should not be faulted for not going further with such musings.
But the meta-questions raised by the "decline" of an important institution
cry out for further investigation, and yes, speculation, because "loser's
history" cannot but be fundamentally speculative. What does it mean
that one of our more potent social tropes, a core component in what the
editors-though to his credit not the author--of this work refer to as
the "distinctiveness and the superiority of the common law system"(vii)
has become a mere symbolic shadow of its former self? Or has this
transformation been greater in. theory than practice? Brown explains
that he has eschewed statistical analysis in order to place the jury "in its
constitutional, political, intellectual and cultural context." (13) But does
this methodology really support his claim that "the jury was where law and
politics often met," (3) or was this just the perception? Did the conscious
decision to be more inclusive of blacks and Irish Roman Catholics in the
jury pool of Nova Scotia make a difference except in the realm of partisan
politics? How does the experience of other "places," especially Quebec
with its hybrid civil/common law system, illuminate the discussion? And
what of places within Ontario and Nova Scotia? For instance, some counties
in Ontario were far more active in petitioning for abolition or reduction in
juries than others-were these poorer counties, counties which had other
priorities for their tax revenue, or were other factors involved? Why, if
jury duty was so onerous and becoming less ideologically important, were
juries in Ontario reformed to be more rather than less elitist? Indeed, why
was the option of expanding the pool to include women, seniors and the
non-propertied seemingly not even considered, especially given the fact
that retirees and the unemployed are the mainstay of today's jury pools?
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Blake Brown has done admirable work in illuminating one of many
"backgrounds" to the intersections of law and politics in a critical period
of state formation in Ontario and Nova Scotia. But this subject is by no
means "done." A Trying Question should be followed by many more
studies of jury composition and activity to build on Brown's pioneering
and indispensable contribution.
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